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Abstract 
It feels intuitive that our actions are intentional, but there is considerable debate about 
whether (and how) humans control their motor behaviour. Recent ideomotor theories of 
action argue that action intentions are fundamentally perceptual, that actions are not only 
controlled by anticipating – imagining – their intended perceptual consequences, but also 
initiated when this action effect activation is strong. Here, we report a study (plus a 
replication) that provides direct evidence for this proposal, showing that even non-intended 
actions are executed when their effects are activated strongly enough. Participants mentally 
rehearsed a movement sequence and were unexpectedly presented with salient visual cues 
that were either compatible or incompatible with their currently imagined action. As 
predicted by ideomotor theories, the combined activation through imagery and perception 
was sufficient to trigger involuntary actions, even when participants were forewarned and 
asked to withhold them. Ideomotor cues, therefore, do not only influence pre-planned 
responses but can effectively insert intentions to act, creating behaviour de novo, as predicted 
from ideomotor theories of action control. 
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Intention insertion: activating an action’s perceptual consequences is sufficient to 
induce non-willed motor behaviour. 
Willed action is one of the biggest puzzles in psychology: do humans will their actions, or do 
they just follow previously established stimulus-response associations, or respond to 
affordances offered by the environment (Tucker & Ellis, 1998)? While a long tradition of 
psychological research, starting with behaviourism, has denied the possibility of voluntary 
action or at least exempted it from psychological enquiry, a parallel tradition has made it its 
central topic. Ideomotor theories argue that people do have voluntary control over their 
actions, and that these action intentions have a fundamentally perceptual format (Hommel, 
2009; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; James, 1890; Ondobaka & 
Bekkering, 2012; Pacherie & Haggard, 2010; Prinz, 1997; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010). 
To initiate an action, these models argue, humans simply bring to mind – imagine – the 
desired outcome: how the action would look, feel and sound, and how it would affect the 
environment. Automatic motor processes make this imagined action reality. Ideomotor 
models – and more recently those based on predictive processing (e.g. Adams, Shipp, & 
Friston, 2013; Friston, 2011) – argue that perceptual control of action is possible because 
people, through a lifetime of interactions, form associations between their motor behaviours 
and the effects that these behaviours reliably produce, for example, that tensing a specific 
muscle group will pull one’s hand to the left, or that pressing a brake pedal will slow a car 
(Turella et al., 2016). As these associations are formed, willed behaviour becomes possible 
(James, 1890): one merely needs to think of (i.e. imagine) the consequences one wants to 
achieve, and via the now established associations the relevant motor behaviours are elicited. 
After sufficient practice, these acts of motor imagery become so effective that they occur 
largely outside of awareness: we imagine our hand moving, and it does.  
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Strikingly, research has largely ignored this intentional or initiating role of action effect 
activation, focussing only on their contribution to selecting or shaping our actions. For 
example, it has been shown that participants execute an action more quickly (and make fewer 
errors) when primed, just prior to execution, with an image of the consequences of the 
intended act, be they “proximal” consequences on the actor’s own body (e.g. a hand posture 
or movement of a body part; see Bach, Peatfield, & Tipper, 2007; Hommel, 1995; Brass, 
Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001) or “distal” consequences in the environment (e.g. a light switching 
on, a tone playing; Elsner & Hommel, 2001). This facilitation even happens when the 
action’s effects are not perceived, but merely anticipated (because they reliably follow the 
action in the response-effect compatibility paradigm, e.g. Kunde, Koch, & Hoffmann, 2004; 
see Badets, Koch, & Philipp, 2016 for review) and neuroimaging studies have shown that 
action planning involves activation in lower-level perceptual regions that represent the 
specific outcome one wants to produce (Kühn, Keizer, Rombouts, & Hommel, 2011; van 
Steenbergen et al., 2017; Zimmermann, Mars, Lange, Toni, & Verhagen, 2018; 
Zimmermann, Verhagen, de Lange, & Toni, 2016). Yet, while such studies provide 
converging evidence that ideomotor cues contribute to the selection of an action against 
alternatives or shape its kinematics (Bach, Griffiths, Weigelt, & Tipper, 2010) they do not 
test the central assumption of ideomotor models: that activation of an action’s perceptual 
effect is tantamount to forming an intention to act, in short, that activation of an action’s 
effects does not only determine which action is selected or how it is executed, but whether it 
is executed at all. 
Recent research conceptualises action initiation in terms of an integration-to-bound 
mechanism, where evidence for an array of appropriate actions accumulates until a threshold 
is reached, and the most suitable action is executed, triggering a cascade of downstream 
motor processes (Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008; Murakami, Vicente, Costa, & Mainen, 
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2014; Schurger, Mylopoulos, & Rosenthal, 2016). If the assumptions of ideomotor models 
are taken seriously, then the evidence accumulated by such mechanisms is nothing else than 
the activation of multimodal action effect codes: how strongly the perceptual consequences of 
the action are mentally represented (see Friston, 2011, for similar arguments in predictive 
processing frameworks). An imagined action can become overt behaviour if the anticipated 
action effects become sufficiently active.  
Tentative support for the equivalence of action effect anticipation and intention comes, on the 
one hand, from the observation that motor imagery increases corticospinal excitability to the 
imagined effector (Vargas et al., 2004) and research on 19th century parlour games such as 
Chevreul’s magic swinging pendulum or the Ouija board. In these games, participants 
experience movements they did not consciously intend to produce (and therefore attribute to 
supernatural causes), but which nevertheless reflect their perceptual expectations of what will 
happen (Chevreul, 1833; Easton & Shor, 1975, 1976, 1977). However, such effects are 
typically small and fall far below the threshold for fully formed responses, even if amplified 
either by these “magic” devices or transcranial magnetic stimulation. Others have therefore 
argued against such an initiating function of action effect anticipation, providing 
neuroimaging and behavioural evidence, for example, that motor imagery mainly affects the 
planning of the action, specifying its form after initiation (Bach, Allami, Tucker, & Ellis, 
2014; Caldara et al., 2004) and that different processes energise and release the action 
(Tecuapetla, Jin, Lima, & Costa, 2016). Indeed, it has been argued that the effects of 
ideomotor cues on action execution reflect interference rather than facilitation effects 
(Ramsey, Cumming, Eastough, & Edwards, 2010) and would therefore – per definition – 
only be able to prevent, not cause, action. 
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This study tested for the first time whether the activation of an action’s effects is sufficient to 
cause participants to execute full actions, even if none were previously intended (and had to 
be actively withheld). It relies on the assumption of ideomotor models that perception, action, 
and imagery operate on the same or commensurable codes and can therefore summate 
(Berends, Wolkorte, Ijzerman, & Van Putten, 2013; Hommel et al., 2001; Kunde et al., 2004; 
Prinz, 1997; Vogt, Di Rienzo, Collet, Collins, & Guillot, 2013; Waszak, Cardoso-Leite, & 
Hughes, 2012). We therefore asked participants, in each trial, to imagine sequences of left 
and right index finger presses. In some trials, we presented them with visual stimuli, which 
could either match the currently imagined action in the sequence (e.g. seeing the same finger 
depressed) or mismatch with it (e.g. a different finger being depressed). Participants were 
instructed to ignore these images and withhold any responses, but the effect codes activated 
by perception and imagery should nevertheless summate (see Kunde et al., 2004) and 
(sometimes) trigger involuntary action, when their activation becomes super-threshold. 
Crucially, manipulating the congruence of imagined and observed actions allows us to 
dissociate involuntary movements that result from the premature release of pre-planned 
actions due to a startle response (Brown et al., 1991; Maslovat, Chua, & Hodges, 2013) from 
those that genuinely result from the summation of action effect codes. In the latter case, 
involuntary responses should be more frequent when the imagined action and cued action 
effects are congruent (such that activation can sum up) than when they are incongruent (when 
such an addition is not possible). Further, these action slips should primarily reflect the 
imagined action and not the alternative response, at least as long as imagined and observed 
actions are congruent. 
Method 
Participants 
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32 participants took part in the experiment (21 female; 5 Left-handed; Age in years: M=22.1, 
SD=3.5), recruited from the Plymouth University’s paid participation pool (remunerated £4). 
The study was approved by Plymouth University’s ethics committee, in according with the 
declaration of Helsinki. The sample size was based on a series of pilot studies in which we 
established the effect and then replicated it here, using identical participant numbers, analyses 
and exclusion criteria. The most recent pilot study is presented in full in the supplementary 
material. All materials, data and an R script detailing the analyses are available online as part 
of the Open Science Framework by following this link - https://goo.gl/AiDpAS  
Materials and Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted in a dark, soundproof room and administered with E-Prime 
2.0 Professional (SP2.0) on a 19” LED computer monitor (Resolution: 1900x1200; Refresh 
rate: 60Hz). Responses were collected with a standard computer keyboard. Participants wore 
over-ear headphones and placed their left and right index fingers over the ‘W’ and ‘O’ keys 
for the duration of the experiment. The stimulus set consisted, first, of two auditory stimuli: a 
200ms 440Hz tone, which served as a metronome beat, as well as a 200ms ‘chirp’, a smooth 
tone which ascended from 200Hz to 800Hz over 200ms. Visual stimuli consisted of two 
images of egocentric left and right hands with artificial ‘shadows’, as if viewed from above 
(each with visual angle of approximately 16° vertically and 14° horizontally). The hands 
were first presented with the fingers in a neutral position, and then with the left or right index 
finger depressed, giving an impression of apparent motion (a downward finger press). 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of 4 blocks of 24 trials. In each trial, participants were first 
instructed about the particular rhythm they had to imagine. An image of the two left and right 
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hands was presented, from an egocentric perspective, and participants heard a slow, steady 
metronome beat (440Hz tone presented at 800ms interval). An arrow moved, in time with the 
metronome beat, between the left or right index fingers, indicating a simple four-beat finger 
tapping sequence (Fig. 1). For any given trial, participants could encounter one of 6 different 
finger tapping patterns which consisted of all possible permutations of a 4-beat sequence 
involving two left and two right index finger movements. Participants were asked to imagine 
tapping along with this sequence and memorize it in this manner.  
After four beats the arrow disappeared, but the metronome continued playing. Participants 
were instructed to continue to mentally rehearse the finger tapping sequence in time with the 
metronome, while refraining from overt movement. The hands remained onscreen in neutral 
position along with a central fixation cross that flashed in time with the metronome beat, 
providing an audio-visual representation of tempo, and drawing participants’ attention to a 
point between the onscreen hands. After a variable duration of 5-8 beats, the word “Go!” 
appeared for 2000ms and participants were asked to perform the keypress they happened to 
be imagining at that point (allowing us to measure task compliance). Participants were 
explicitly instructed to refrain from overt movement before this go signal. It was emphasized 
to even refrain from moving when surprising visual stimuli would appear during the 
imagination period. 
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of a compatible cued trial beats from the Test Phase in our experiment. 
The depicted sequence is Left – Right – Left – Right – indicated by the arrows shown in the Learning Phase. In 
the subsequent five beat Imagination Phase, a Right index finger cue (screen colour, deviant tone and observed 
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finger movement) falls on beat four. The cue is presented when the participant is imagining a Right response 
and so this is compatible with the concurrent imagined response. We recorded the presence or absence of an 
action slip (keypress) in the 800ms inter-beat period following cue onset. Participants were told to focus on their 
imagery and refrain from overt movement until presentation of the probe stimulus, “Go!” 
The crucial manipulation was that in 8 of the 24 trials in each block, unexpected action effect 
cues appeared at the onset of one of the metronome beats (on either beat, 6, 7 or 8). The 
action effect cues consisted of images of the left or right index fingers moving downwards 
and back to a neutral position, mirroring what participants would see if they actually carried 
out a finger tap themselves. Action effects were presented in tandem with a background 
colour change to yellow to increase the salience of the events. The finger movement cues 
were either compatible or incompatible with the finger movement that participants were 
currently imagining (if the participant correctly followed the tapping sequence). Within these 
32 cued trials, all combinations of cue compatibility (compatible/incompatible), cued finger 
(left/right), trial length (5, 6, 7 and 8 beats) and cue placement in the sequence (1 or 2 beats 
prior to sequence end) occurred once and were therefore fully counterbalanced.  
Prior to the main task, participants completed a short practice of 8 trials in which feedback 
was provided and incorrect responses were repeated. Participants were given the option of 
repeating the practice if required. The experimenter monitored participants’ performance in 
this practice session. He emphasized that participants’ ability to imagine – not execute – the 
movements was being tested. He instructed them not to move their fingers in the imagery 
interval and intervened if this instruction was not followed. He also unobtrusively remained 
in the room during the experiment proper in order to intervene if active finger movements 
were detected.  
Results 
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The procedure and analysis strategy was first developed in a pilot experiment (N = 26; 
reported in full in the supplementary material) and then replicated here. This pilot study only 
differed from the current experiment in that the tones that accompanied the visual cues were 
lateralised (i.e. a left-panned tone for depressed left fingers, right-panned tone for depressed 
right fingers), but was otherwise identical, including all analysis steps and exclusion criteria. 
Please see the end of the Results section for the main results of this pilot study. 
We used the percentage of correct responses to our probe stimulus (i.e. when "Go!" appeared 
and participants executed the currently imagined action) during trials which did not 
contain visual action cues to assess whether participants were engaging in the imagery task. 
Because all further analyses depend on task compliance, and as in the pilot experiment, we 
set conservative criteria and only considered participants with accuracy rates within one 
standard deviation of the group mean (chance=50%; M=84.3%; SD=15.9%) leading to the 
removal of 4 participants (leaving N = 28). Exclusion of these participants does not affect the 
results. All results remain significant even when these participants are included. 
First, to check whether participants followed our instruction to refrain from actively moving 
their fingers in the imagery intervals, we compared the number of slips on non-cued trials. In 
the absence of visual stimuli, accidental button presses were exceedingly rare and occurred 
on only 0.1% of beat intervals. These non-cued slips were roughly equally distributed 
between button presses with the imagined and non-imagined finger, suggesting that 
participants were not using finger movements to rehearse the imagined pattern (14 imagined 
vs. 10 non-imagined slips across all participants, χ2 = .667, p = .414). 
The data were analysed using generalised linear mixed-effects regression, GLMER, using the 
glmer() function of the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) in R Version 
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3.4.2 (R Core team, 2017). When modelling binary responses with GLMER, null hypothesis 
significance testing is implemented by comparing a full model and a reduced model without 
the fixed effect of interest with a likelihood ratio test (hereafter, LRT). The resulting chi-
square test statistic is analogous to the F-statistic in conventional models. We report the 
estimate given by the GLMER model along with a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval 
based on 1000 simulations. All categorical predictors are effect coded and when referring to 
model parameters we capitalise the first letter for ease of comprehension. 
Analysis proceeded in three steps. We first tested whether the surprising visual stimuli would 
induce unintended key presses (i.e. action slips) in the imagination period. To do this, each 
800ms inter-beat period (hereafter, simply ‘Beat’) was treated as a discrete event in which an 
action slip could have occurred or not (coded one or zero respectively). The model included 
fixed effects of Cue Presence (2 levels: Yes/No) and Trial (1-96, logged and mean centred) 
and a random intercept for each Participant and each Beat. In addition, we allowed the effect 
of Cue Presence, Trial and their interaction to vary within Participant by including random 
slopes for these terms. Such an approach is roughly analogous to a repeated measures one-
way ANOVA with the factor Cue Presence. As predicted, the presence of unexpected cues 
significantly increased the probability of action slips, LRT: χ2 (1) = 56.94, p < .001; GLMER 
estimate: β = 4.2, 95% CI = [3.55, 5.26]. Predicted probabilities derived from repeated 
simulation of our model reveal that there was a 8.57% [3.89, 18.03] chance of an action slip 
following the onset of a cue, but only .09% [.03, .22] when no cue was present. In addition, 
Cue Presence and Trial interacted, LRT: χ2 (1) = 8.63, p = .003; GLMER estimate: β = -.79, 
95% CI = [-1.46, -.34], indicating that cues became less effective at eliciting action slips over 
the course of the experiment. We did not find evidence of a main effect of Trial on the 
probability of an action slip occurring. 
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The second step of the analysis tested whether general action slips (i.e. any keypress 
response) would primarily be elicited by cues that match the currently imagined finger key 
press, not by those that mismatched. We constructed a smaller dataset only consisting of 
intervals in which cues were present (i.e. each participant contributed 32 observations), coded 
for whether the cue was compatible or incompatible with the currently imagined action. The 
model included fixed effects of Perception-Imagery Compatibility (2 levels: 
Compatible/Incompatible) and Cue Position within the trial series (ranked 1st to 32nd, log 
transformed and mean centred) and a random intercept for each Participant. In addition, we 
added random slopes for Perception-Imagery Compatibility, Cue Position and their 
interaction, which allowed each participant to vary in their general response bias. The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of Cue Position, LRT: χ2 (1) = 44.43, p < .001; 
GLMER estimate: β = -1.36, 95% CI = [-1.79, -1.12], reflecting the fact that action slips were 
most likely in the early stages of the experiment and became less frequent as it progressed. 
Importantly, as predicted, there was a main effect of Perception-Imagery Compatibility, LRT: 
χ2 (1) = 7.59, p = .006; GLMER estimate: β = .54, 95% CI = [.22, 1.07]. Action slips were 
more likely when observed finger press and the imagined finger press were identical 
compared to when they were different. In addition, Perception-Imagery Compatibility and 
Cue Position interacted, LRT: χ2 (1) = 5.59, p = .018; GLMER estimate: β = .34, 95% CI = 
[.07, .76]. Figure 2, middle panel, suggests that this is because action slip frequency was 
roughly equivalent in the compatible and incompatible conditions early in the session (when 
the number of action slips across both conditions was high), but that the difference between 
the compatible and incompatible conditions emerged later in the session when participants 
had adjusted to the surprising cues and the total number of slips had declined.  
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Figure 2. Observed frequencies and predicted probabilities of general and specific action slips by condition. 
Four plots showing, from left to right; (a) a box plot of the observed frequency of action slips produced by each 
participant, broken down by Perception-Imagery Compatibility with a thick black bar to represent the median, a 
box showing the interquartile range and whiskers to indicate maxima and minima, (b) a combination plot 
indicating the predicted probability of action slips across the experiment according to Perception-Imagery 
Compatibility and the associated difference plot (i.e. Compatible - Incompatible) in which the shaded area 
shows a 95% confidence interval derived by simulation, and (c) a stacked bar plot indicating the predicted 
proportion of specific action slips (i.e. either the imagined action or alternative action) made according to 
Perception-Imagery Compatibility, derived by simulation.  
Finally, we tested the hypothesis that specific action slips (i.e. the specific keypress response) 
should generally reflect the currently imagined key press, and that the alternative action 
would primarily be elicited by an incompatible cue. We created a new dataset consisting of 
only observations in which an action slip occurred and added a new outcome variable 
indicating whether the participant had executed the imagined or alternative action (coded one 
and zero respectively). The model included fixed effects of Perception-Imagery 
Compatibility, Cue Position and their interaction along with a random intercept for each 
Participant. In addition, we included a random slope for Perception-Imagery Compatibility. 
The test revealed a significant main effect of Perception-Imagery Compatibility, LRT: χ2 (1) 
= 19.01, p <.001; GLMER estimate: β = 5.73, 95% CI = [3.81, 16.19]. Predicted 
probabilities, derived by simulation, reveal that there was a 100% [93.83, 100] chance that 
participants would execute the imagined response when faced with a compatible cue, but only 
a 65.57% [49, 79.2] chance in response to an incompatible cue (Figure 2, right panel).  
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Importantly, confidence intervals for compatible cues in particular did not overlap with 
chance (i.e. 50%), showing that participants were much more likely to produce the currently 
imagined response compared to the alternative response. Cue Position and the interaction 
between Perception-Imagery Compatibility and Cue Position did not affect which action was 
executed. 
These results replicate our pilot study (reported in full in the supplementary material). 
Specifically, the pilot study showed that action slips were more likely following visual cues 
relative to when no cue was present (LRT: χ2 (1) = 30.1, p < .001; GLMER estimate: β = 
3.15, 95% CI = [2.28, 3.87]), that action slips were more likely following compatible rather 
than incompatible visual cues (LRT: χ2 (1) = 4.91, p = .027; GLMER estimate: β = -.83, 95% 
CI = [.21, 3.99]), and that participants were more likely to press with the non-imagined finger 
when presented with an incompatible cue that primed the non-imagined response, relative to 
a compatible cue (LRT: χ2 (1) = 9.52, p = .002; GLMER estimate: β = 2.64, 95% CI = [1.62, 
22.2]). 
General Discussion 
We asked participants to imagine – but not execute – sequences of finger movements, and 
unexpectedly presented them, at some point during their imagination, with visual images of 
these actions being executed. If forming an action intention is equivalent to activating the 
relevant action effect codes, then the summed activation of these codes through imagery and 
perception may suffice to make them super-threshold, causing participants to sometimes 
execute even movements that they were asked to withhold. Such effects would go beyond 
prior work showing that observing (or imagining) actions modulates selection or executing 
planned actions – speeding up responses to congruent cues or inducing subtle changes in 
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associated muscle activity – and confirm a long-held but untested assumption of ideomotor 
models: that activating an action’s effects is equivalent to inducing a motor intention that 
leads to overt action when activated strongly enough. 
Consistent with these predictions, the combination of imagined and observed action effects 
effectively induced non-willed button presses. This effect was strongest when the observed 
and imagined actions were identical, and was weaker when they were different. This rules out 
the possibility that the action slips were merely startle responses or the release of prepared 
actions triggered by surprising stimuli (Brown et al., 1991; Maslovat et al., 2013) because this 
should occur equally for compatible and incompatible stimuli. Instead, it is consistent with 
the hypothesized summation of action effect codes, which can happen only if imagined and 
observed action effects are compatible, but not if they are incompatible. The data therefore 
show for the first time that activating an action’s perceptual consequences does not only 
support action planning or selection (see Keller & Koch, 2006, for an application to similar 
finger sequences as used here), but – in line with ideomotor models – is equivalent to forming 
an action intention, which when strong enough, suffices to trigger action.  
Two further aspects of our results confirm this interpretation. First, the effect of cue-imagery 
summation emerged later in the experiment and led to a persistent increase in action slips 
when visual and imagined action were identical, again ruling out that action slips reflect mere 
startle responses or a release of pre-planned responses. Second, presentation of action effects 
primarily caused participants to execute the currently imagined action, compared to the 
alternative finger press. As predicted, the frequency with which the alternative (non-
imagined) action was executed only increased when imagined and presented action effects 
were not identical, and the visual action cue therefore activated the currently non-imagined 
action (replicating the results of the pilot experiment). This shows that two simultaneously 
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activated actions intentions – one derived from imagery and one from observation – compete 
with each other, such that both can trigger involuntary responses independently, albeit less 
frequently than if both plans are identical and can summate (Hommel, 2009; Hommel et al., 
2001).  
Previous work has characterised action initiation as an integration-to-bounds mechanism, 
which accumulates evidence for appropriate actions and executes the most suitable one if a 
threshold is reached, irrespective of whether this evidence results from the evaluation of 
imperative task cues or from internal decisions about whether to act or to wait (Churchland et 
al., 2008; Murakami et al., 2014). Once an action has surpassed the threshold, it triggers an 
“avalanche” of motor processes, supported by deep brain structures such as the basal ganglia, 
which facilitate fluent execution. Our data is entirely consistent with this view but reveals, for 
the first time, that activated action effects – either through imagery or action observation – 
can stand in for this accumulation of evidence, making the decision super-threshold without 
additional processing. The data therefore provide direct evidence for the notion that forming 
an action intention may be identical to activating – imagining – the action’s effects, which is 
executed when its activation is strong enough (Prinz, 1997; Stock & Stock, 2004). Our 
findings go beyond prior research that has shown only that motor imagery (Ramsey et al., 
2010), action observation (e.g. Bach, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2011; Bach et al., 2007; Brass et al., 
2001) and learned action effect associations (e.g. Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Kunde et al., 
2004) can modulate the selection, speed and accuracy of already planned responses, but 
which has left open whether action effect activation suffices to elicit actions independently.  
An open question is how an action-effect based control of action is implemented. We have 
assumed that activated action effects induce action intentions by adding activation to one 
particular action until it becomes super-threshold, so that it is executed. However, it is also 
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possible that either the visual or the imagery-based action effects act by removing inhibition 
from one particular action (e.g. Rieger, Dahm, & Koch, 2017), in line with James’ dictum 
(1890) that a mental idea of an action will lead to overt execution, as long as it is “not kept 
from so doing by an antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind” (p. 526). 
We are agnostic about these two possibilities. On a conceptual level, both are equivalent, as 
both summation of activation and removal of inhibition have a net positive effect in bringing 
activation closer to threshold and inducing overt behaviour. Indeed, intentions to not act have 
been shown to be similarly controlled by mental images of non-action (e.g. Kühn, Elsner, 
Prinz, & Brass, 2009; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Brass, 2014), and both inhibiting 
and excitatory roles have been attributed to complementary basal ganglia-prefrontal circuits 
for action execution (for a recent review, see Calabresi, Picconi, Tozzi, Ghiglieri, & Di 
Filippo, 2014). However, while our study was not designed to resolve this issue, we believe 
that it may provide tentative support for an “energizing” role of action effect activation. If the 
visual action cues would primarily act through removing inhibition, then they should have 
induced action slips only for the currently imagined action; removing inhibition should not 
cause a fully-fledged button press of the un-imagined finger. This was not the case. Even the 
currently non-imagined action was executed  - albeit less frequently than the imagined 
response - if it was so cued by the respective visual action cue, providing some evidence for 
an additive, “energizing” influence on action effect codes. 
Action in the real world has been conceptualised as an interaction of higher-level goals with 
lower-level cues from the environment: actions are executed if they match both the 
individual’s goals and are afforded by the environment (Cisek, 2007; Guérard & Brodeur, 
2015; Kunde, Elsner, & Kiesel, 2007; Ondobaka & Bekkering, 2012). Our experimental 
paradigm can be considered as a model for these interactions. In ideomotor frameworks, 
higher-level goals are nothing else than the imagined action effects one wants to achieve 
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(Hommel et al., 2001), similar to the imagined actions in the present study. Our study shows 
that bottom-up activity induced by perceptual cues in the environment – in our case the 
observed actions – activate the same effect codes, and that we execute actions that are 
consistent with both. It may therefore explain why many everyday actions are executed 
seemingly automatically, simply because they match the goals one has previously committed 
to and the structure of the environment (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Kunde et al., 2007), or 
why one’s longer-term action plans (e.g. healthy eating) are followed more easily when one 
has visualised one’s behaviour in the relevant situation (Brandstatter, Lengfelder, & 
Gollwitzer, 2001). They may also explain the wide range of action slips that people make, 
where they sometimes perform unintended actions (e.g., putting their car keys in the fridge 
while leaving milk out on the table or making a wrong, but habitual, turn at a traffic junction), 
find themselves copying the postures and mannerisms of others (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), 
or respond, in a seemingly non-intentional way, to ideomotor suggestions during hypnosis 
(e.g. an arm levitation suggestion).  
Conclusion 
How do people “will” their actions? We found that activation of action effects through 
imagery and perception was sufficient to elicit actions of the participants, even when 
instructed to be on guard against such slips. This provides direct evidence for the central tenet 
of ideomotor models, that forming an action intention is equivalent to bringing to mind the 
action’s perceptual effects, and that a motor intention is nothing else than the activated action 
effects crossing a response threshold. Our results link voluntary control of action in everyday 
life to classical ideomotor effects in hypnosis and related phenomena (Chevreul’s pendulum, 
Ouija board), providing direct support for James’ (1890) claim that ideomotor control of 
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action is not “a curiosity” but the “normal process” through which people control their own 
actions. 
Context 
This research was motivated by classical ideomotor phenomena (i.e. Chevreul's Pendulum) 
wherein people produce movements that they report feel "unintentional". We are interested in 
how such behaviour could arise in the absence of a specific intention and, more specifically, 
whether we can effectively insert an intention to act by manipulating the interacting processes 
of action, perception and imagery. This experiment is one part of an ongoing programme of 
research by the first author and his supervisory team into the role of action effect 
representations in the chain of events which links goals, intentions, actions and their sensory 
consequences. The supervisory team have published widely on topics related to perceptual 
anticipation, including ideomotor action control (Bach et al., 2010), predictive social 
perception (Bach, Nicholson, & Hudson, 2014; Bach & Schenke, 2017; Hudson, Nicholson, 
Simpson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016) and the role of associative learning in environmentally-cued 
actions (Hardy, Mitchell, Seabrooke, & Hogarth, 2017; Seabrooke, Le Pelley, Hogarth, & 
Mitchell, 2017). 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of a compatible cued trial beats from the Test Phase 
in our experiment. The depicted sequence is Left – Right – Left – Right – indicated by the 
arrows shown in the Learning Phase. In the subsequent five beat Imagination Phase, a 
Right index finger cue (screen colour, deviant tone and observed finger movement) falls 
on beat four. The cue is presented when the participant is imagining a Right response and 
so this is compatible with the concurrent imagined response. We recorded the presence or 
absence of an action slip (keypress) in the 800ms inter-beat period following cue onset. 
Participants were told to focus on their imagery and refrain from overt movement until 
presentation of the probe stimulus, “Go!” 
 
Figure 2. Observed frequencies and predicted probabilities of general and specific action 
slips by condition. Four plots showing, from left to right; (a) a box plot of the observed 
frequency of action slips produced by each participant, broken down by Perception-
Imagery Compatibility with a thick black bar to represent the median, a box showing the 
interquartile range and whiskers to indicate maxima and minima, (b) a combination plot 
indicating the predicted probability of action slips across the experiment according to 
Perception-Imagery Compatibility and the associated difference plot (i.e. Compatible - 
Incompatible) in which the shaded area shows a 95% confidence interval derived by 
simulation, and (c) a stacked bar plot indicating the predicted proportion of specific action 
slips (i.e. either the imagined action or alternative action) made according to Perception-
Imagery Compatibility, derived by simulation.  
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